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speculative activity. Congress has empowered judges in Chapter X re-
organizations to limit claims purchased by certain insiders in the course of
such proceedings to their actual cost.8 4  Similarly, the SEC has denied par-
ticipation to securities purchased by management officials during a public
utility reorganization. 5 And courts have traditionally penalized trustees, the
analogues of corporate directors,36 by denying them profits from transactions
between themselves and the estate.37 Application of a different rule to insider
trading during insolvency ignores the role of the judiciary in preventing as
well as penalizing management infidelity to the investing public.
THE SWINGING DOOR-OR HOW TO OBEY ONE
ANTITRUST LAW BY VIOLATING ANOTHER*
TES Robinson-Patman Act' was enacted to protect small wholesalers and
retailers2 from their larger competitors who were using immense purchasing
(2d. Cir. 1949). The court, however, failed to realize that the main purpose of the limita-
tion rule is to deter spectilative activity rather than to make whole the former creditors.
To the extent that former creditors can be located, they might be given an equitable
interest in the reorganization proceedings. When these creditors are unascertainable, how-
ever, and unclaimed profits are distributed among creditors participating in the reorganiza-
tion, courts must guard against insiders subverting the limitation rule by deliberately pur-
chasing bonds during insolvency in order to increase their dividend on bonds purchased
during solvency. Moreover, in case insiders succeed in buying up an entire class of securi-
ties, courts must be prepared to subordinate their claims to other classes of security holders
or to general creditors.
34. Bankruptcy Act §212, 52 STAT. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 612 (1946). See note 3
.upra.
35. Sustained under the order-making power conferred by the Public Utility Holding
Company Act. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). Previous to this decision, a
divided Supreme Court had held that judicially established common law standards did not
bar corporate fiduciaries from trading during utility company reorganizations. SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1942). But see Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1942).
36. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939). See generally Dodd, For WhIopn
Are Corporate Managers Trustees? 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932) ; Berle, For Whont
Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1365 (1932) ; BERLE &
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PRoPERTY 247-76 (1934).
37. Magruder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106 (1914). RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 170 (1935).
* Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949).
1. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1946). The relevant portion of section
2(a) of the Act reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . .
to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities o( like grade and
quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen com-
petition. .. ."
2. The United States Wholesale Grocers' Association was the prime mover behind
the Robinson-Patman Bill. Indeed, the first draft was written by counsel for this or-
ganization. See ZORN & FELDMAN, BUSINESS UNDER THE NEW PRICE LAWS 51 (1937);
Note, The Robinson-Patnia, Bill, 24 GEo. L.J. 951-5 (1936).
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power as a means of exacting price concessions from producers.3 Sponsors
of the Act hoped to restore the competitive balance which these concessions
upset. They felt that efficiency rather than mere size should be the criterion
of survival, and that the two were not necessarily synonymous.4 But law-
yers and economists were quick to warn that the Robinson-Patman Act,
carried to its logical conclusion, would clash with the broad purposes of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.5 While the Sherman Act basically is geared toward
achieving a competitive price structure,0 the Robinson-Patman Act encour-
ages substantial price rigidity.- Though the Sherman Act has belabored the
monopoly producer," the Robinson-Patman Act shields him from the bar-
gaining pressures of the large buyer.9 The recent Standard Oil Co. v. FTC0
decision sharply portrays the disharmony.
The defendant, Standard Oil of Indiana, was a major petroleum supplier
in the Detroit area. Standard made the bulk of its deliveries directly to re-
tail service stations, who were charged the "tank-wagon" price. Some inde-
pendent "wholesale" 11 distributors, however, were given a one and one-half
cent per gallon discount from the "tank-wagon" price. Taking advantage
3. FTC, FmAL REPORT ONz Tam CHnIN-STonE ImvEST= TjoN 53-65 (1934);
Phillips, The Robinson-Patnzan. Anti-Price Discrimination Law, and the Chain Store,
15 HARv. Bus. REv. 62-7 (1936).
4. For an examination of the economic philosophy and ambitions of one of the
bill's sponsors, see Stockbridge, What Does Mr. Patunan Mean?, Today, Nov. 7, 1936,
p. 6.
5. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946). For an excellent discussion of the
inherent dichotomy of purpose between the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts, see
Burns, The Anti-Trust Law's and the Regulation of Price Competition, 4 Lw & Con-
TEMP. PROB. 301-20 (1937).
6. "[Trade and commerce] are 'monopolized' within the meaning of the fed-
eral statute [Sherman Act], when . . .a few persons acting together can control the
prices of a commodity moving in interstate commerce." American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946). (Italics added.)
7. Learned & Isaacs, The Robinson-Patman Law: Some Assumptions and Expecta-
tions, 15 HIAv. Bus. Rav. 137, 139 (1936). "And since it [Robinson-Patman Act]
stops competition at the [production] level where it is most effective in American busi-
ness, the only level where aggressive buying makes inroads on fixed prices, it amounts
to a repeal of the antitrust policy in a very important part of American business." (Italics
added.) See also Gordon, The Robinson-Patian Anti-Discrimination Act in Busixss
AND TEE ROBINSON-PATmAN LAW 40 (,Verne ed. 1938).
8. E.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
9. See ED wARs, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 169 (1949).
10. 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), modifying 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945).
11. In reality, one of the four "wholesale" dealers, Ned's Auto Supply Company,
was exclusively a retailer, operating four to six service stations. Two of the remaining
three dealers operated several retail stations in addition to their wholesale business. The
fourth, Stikeman Oil Company, Inc., was a legitimate wholesaler. Brief for Respondent,
pp. 18, 19. However, each of the four favored distributors had large storage facilities
and made his own deliveries. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 7, 8. But in framing its order
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of this discount, wholesalers resold below the "tank-wagon" price to retail
outlets competing with others buying directly from Standard.
The Seventh Circuit, upholding the Federal Trade Commission, found that
Standard's discount to wholesalers violated section 2 of the Robinson-Patman
Act. Retailers buying directly from Standard, the court held, were injured
in their competition with retailers buying through the independent wholesal-
ers. The court found that the discrimination was not justified by cost sav-
ings.12 Furthermore, Standard's defense that the discount was "an effort in
good faith to meet competition of other producers" was ruled unavailable
where competition between retailers might be injured.'3  The cease and de-
sist order, as modified by the court, forbids Standard to grant wholesale dis-
tributors any discounts, where it knows or ought to know the wholesaler re-
sells to retailers at below the "tank-wagon" price.14
the court, like Standard Oil, took no account of the functional differences of the jobbers
involved.
12. 173 F2d 210, 213 (7th Cir. 1949). The Robinson-Patman Act does not con-
tain an absolute prohibition against price differentials. Section 2(a), note 1 supra, con-
tinues: "Provided ... nothing ... shall prevent differentials which make only due
allowances for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the
differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold
or delivered."
This proviso has customarily been interpreted as permitting funclional discounts to
wholesalers. Functional discounts are often justifiable on a cost basis, since wholesalers
perform storage, transportation, and advertising services which the seller would other-
.vise assume. See, e.g., Bird & Son, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 548, 553 (1937) (evidence established
cost justification of functional discounts). For a discussion of FTC treatment of func-
tional discounts under the Robinson-Patman Act, see Crowley, Equal Price Trcaltticu
Under the Robinson-Patinan Act, 95 U. OF PA. L. REv. 306, 328 (1947) ; Shniderman,
The Tyranny of Labels, 60 HAv. L. REY. 571 (1947).
13. 173 F.2d 210, 217 (1949). This is the principal holding of the case.
Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act reads in part: "Nothing ... shall pre-
vent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower
price . .. to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally
low price of a competitor...."
After the passage of the Act, this was considered a "doubtful defense" by one of
the bill's sponsors. See PATMAN, THE RoBINSOX-PAISTAN Acr 182 (1938). However,
the Court's language in International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 399
(1947) and FTC v. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 760 (1945) seemed to indicate that
a producer charged with price discrimination could rely upon the "good faith" proviso
as a complete defense. Accord: Shefford Cheese Co., 25 F.T.C. 1209 (1937)(conm-
plaint charging discrimination dismissed on ground that discounts "were made to meet
those of competitors.")
For a discussion and criticism of the court's holding, see Berger & Goldstein, Meet-
ing Competition Under the Robinson-Patinan Act, 44 ILL. L. REV. 315 (1949); 62 HAav.
L. REy. 1249 (1949). See Note, 49 COL. L. REv. 863 (1949) for an approval of the
court's position.
14. Paragraph 6 of the modified cease and desist order prohibits Standard Oil
from granting discounts "where such jobber or wholesaler, to the knowledge of the
respondent or under such circumstances as are reasonably calculated to impute knowl-
edge to the respondent, resells such gasoline or intends to resell the same to any of its
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The court suggests alternate courses that Standard might pursue in com-
pliance with the order. First, Standard may continue the price differential,
but refuse to sell to wholesalers who resell below the "tank-wagon" price.
In this, the court is inviting Standard to engage in resale price maintenance,
even though such action violates section 1 of the Sherman Act.'5 The right
of a producer to refuse sales is not unqualified---especially when refusal to
sell is part of an overall resale price maintenance program.18 Moreover, the
inquisitive policing that would be needed to implement such a policy is in it-
self highly unpopular with courts.'1 Aside from its legal consequences, re-
said retail-customers at less than respondent's posted tank-wagon price... ." 173 F.2d
210, 217 (2d Cir. 1949). Under the original order filed by the Federal Trade Com-
mission, Standard Oil faced liability whenever the "tank-vagon" price was cut by
benefited wholesalers. 41 F.T.C. 263, 285 (1945). The scienter requirement .vas added
by the Seventh Circuit.
15. Section 1 of the Sherman Act punishes every contract, combination or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade. Resale price maintenance agreements were long pro-
hibited under this language. E.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 373 (1911). The Miller-Tydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1946), blessed resale price maintenance agreements wherever permitted by state law.
Today, 45 states have enacted legislation approving this restraint. But the Supreme
Court has narrowly construed Miller-Tydings. See United States v. Frankfort Dis-
tilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945). Thus the act should offer Standard scant comfort, for
resale price maintenance agreements are still prohibited between "persons, firms, or cor-
porations in competition with each other." In the Detroit area, Standard and its whole-
salers are in competition, inasmuch as both sell to retail service stations. Any price
maintenance agreements between them would be a horizontal agreement e.\pressly pro-
hibited.
Nor can Standard Oil plead that compliance with this order excuses violation of
the Sherman Act. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §45(e) (1946) explicitly provides:
"No order of the commission or judgment of court to enforce the same shall in anywise
relieve or absolve any person, partnership, or corporation from any liability under the
Antitrust Acts."
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of this is its apparent inconsistency with the
Federal Trade Commission's usual stand against resale price maintenance. In a 1945
report, the Commission was sharply critical of the Mfiller-Tydings Act: "The Com-
mission believes that the consumer is not only entitled to competition between rival
products but to competition between dealers handling the same branded products."
FTC, REPoRr ON REsALE PRicE AI=NANcE, (1945). And see note 16, infra.
16. E.g., Sidney Morris & Co. v. National Ass'n of Stationers, 40 F2d 620 (7th
Cir. 1930). Courts have frowned upon refusal to sell wherever resale price maintenance
was the underlying purpose. For an analysis of this problem see Comment, 53 YA=-
LJ. 1121, 1128, 1132-4 (1949).
The Federal Trade Commission has pending an action against General Mlotors
Corp., CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1638523 (FTC 1939), in which, among other offenses,
the defendant is charged with threatening cancellatioa or price increase unless buyers
maintained resale prices.
17. E.g., United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942) (licensees required
to assist seller to secure evidence against those buyers reselling below established price) ;
FTC v. Beech-Nut Pacdng Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (numbering paclmges in order to
facilitate detection of price-cutting) ; Q.R.S. Music Co. v. FTC, 12 F.2d 730 (7th Cir.
1926) (procuring agents and retailers to report price-cutters).
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sale price maintenance in the sale of gasoline would increase the already en-
ergetic role major refiners play in determining the retail price the consumer
must pay.' 8
Alternately, the court suggests Standard undertake a one-price policy to
all buyers. 19 Yet a uniform price, set at the "tank-wagon" price, will prob-
ably eliminate the independent wholesaler as a distributor of Standard prod-
ucts. 20  Perhaps he can remain an active gadfly by switching to the inde-
pendent refiner with no retail outlets.21 But in many industries there is no
such option, and elimination of the mass distributor and independent whole-
saler-like resale price maintenance-would considerably strengthen the pro-
ducers' control over price.
In modifying the original order, the Court was concerned lest Standard Oil be
forced to police its wholesalers. 173 F2d 210, 217 (7th Cir. 1949). See note 14 supra.
But query: does the modification satisfy the court's objection to the original order?
Standard Oil still faces liability if a wholesaler undercuts the "tank-wagon" price when-
ever knowledge of such action may reasonably be imputed to the producer. In the
closely-knit Detroit market, courts could justifiably impute knowledge to Standard Oil
of any wholesaler breach. It is doubtful, to say the least, that Standard Oil will risk
lackadaisical policing under the modified order.
18. For a discussion of price leadership in the petroleum industry, see RoSToW, A
NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY 53, 75-6 (1948); CooK, CONTROL OF Tug
PEM'OLEUM INDUSTRY BY MAJOR OIL COMPAN ES 41 (TNEC Monograph 39, 1941).
A study of the petroleum industry by the Federal Trade Commission reached the fol-
lowing conclusion: "Price leadership in the form of posted prices both for the purchase
of crude petroleum and for wholesale and retail sales of gasoline is characteristic of
the industry." FTC, DISTRmIBUTION MErHODS AND COSTS, pt. IV, 84 (1944),
For years the petroleum industry has been one of the prime targets of the antitrust
division. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949)
(requirement contracts entered into by independent retailers with defendant producer
declared invalid); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (in-
validating buying program which stabilized retail prices) ; Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United
States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940) (licensing agreements with refiners, which controlled resale
price policy, held unlawful). In the light of this history, a decision encouraging resale
price maintenance by a petroleum supplier becomes even stranger.
19. Bird & Son, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 548 (1937), approved a one-price policy to whole-
salers and mail-order houses, despite objection by the jobbers that one-price treatment
effectively discriminated against them.
20. This suggestion in effect substitutes one form of price discrimination for an-
other. The wholesaler is now the victim. He must resell to retailers at the same price
he himself pays, i.e., perform distributing functions for free. Compare the similar dis-
crimination enforced by the brokerage clause of the Robinson-Patman Act, 40 SrAT.
1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1946), discussed in Note, 58 YALE L.J. 969, 973 (1949),
Construing the order literally, functional discounts, which are often justifiable as a
cost saving, seem equally disfavored. At least this is so if a wholesaler, receiving a
"legitimate" discount, turns around and undersells the producer's direct price, But func-
tional discounts don't seem incompatible with the purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act.
See Van Cise, Functional Prices, in NEw YORK STATE BAR ASS'N, RODiNSON-PATMAN
Acr SYmposiUm 89 (1947).
21. Independent refiners are a "troublesome" element in the market structure.
However, their percentage of the total market is small and has remained relatively
stable. Naturally, the majors are anxious to preserve the status quo. This has been
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Theoretically, a one-price policy is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
Sherman Act. This assumes, however, a measure of competition at the pro-
ducer level. Actually oligopoly, or market domination by a few producers, is
a widespread phenomenon. 22  If it were administratively and economically
possible to atomize all oligopolies, there would be no need to rely on the large
buyer to restore a measure of competition. But practically speaking, the gov-
ernment's policing facilities are limited.m Furthermore, fragmentation would
reduce the efficiency of many industries..2 4  Under these circumstances, the
pressure of large buyers is a useful thing to have around. The resulting price
discrimination is perhaps unfortunate for some competitors, but a forced
one-price policy is likely to have unfortunate effects on competition in gen-
eral, by bolstering rigid oligopoly pricing.2
In effect, oligopoly and resale price maintenance, both objectionable under
the Sherman Act, are buttressed by this Robinson-Patman Act decision.
Perhaps in ruling out the "meeting competition in good faith" proviso the
Seventh Circuit has incorrectly interpreted the Robinson-Patman Act.2 0 But
if the court is affirmed on appeal,27 Congress could do well to reconsider its
antitrust vehicles, which seem to be chugging off in opposite directions.
accomplished through buying programs designed to keep surplus gasoline off the market
(see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)); the use of
"off-brand" subsidiaries to meet the independent's lower retail price; and an overwhelm-
ing financial ability to successfully withstand any price war. Although scattered in-
dependents may benefit from a one-price policy, their overall strength should change
little. For a discussion of the independents and their relation to the major petroleum
producers, see Rosiow, op. cit. supra note 18, 70-87.
22. See WILcox, COmPETITION AND MONOPOLY In AERmmmcx I-DUsTRY 5 (TXEC
Monograph 21, 1940).
23. See Bergson, Enforcing Antitrust, Fortune, August, 1949, p. 117, for a discus-
sion of the limitations facing the Antitrust Divisions of the Department of Justice.
24. See Blair, Does Large-Scale Enterprise Result in Lower Costs?, 38 AM. Eco-.
REv. 121 (1948 Supp.). Although this treatise foresees (and approves) a trend toward
decentralization of industry, studies quoted indicate that some industries prosper with
increasing size. Id. at 146. See also EnwARDs, op. cit. supra note 9. at 111.
25. See CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPeTITIo. 30-55 (1946);
WILcOX, op. cit. supra note 2, at 121-32. Price concessions by one producer are
almost invariably matched by his competitors, and in the end each producer will have
no more than the share of the market he began with, although at a smaller profit. Hence
the phenomenon of "follow-the-leader" pricing at the production level, at a price likely
to return the greatest monopoly profits.
26. See note 13 supra.
27. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari. 18 U.S.L. WFXi 3149 (U.S. Nov. 7,
1949).
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